# Lecture 5: Implementations of quantum cryptography


### **Content**

- Properties of fiber-optic and open channels.
- Fiber-optic, atmospheric and satellite systems and their main characteristics.
- Key distribution networks.
- Interfacing to classical encryptors.
- Commercialization.





### Differential phase shift-quantum key distribution




[Takesue, Hiroki & Honjo, Toshimori & Tamaki, Kiyoshi & Tokura, Yasuhiro. (2009). Differential phase shift-quantum key distribution. Communications Magazine, IEEE. 47. 102 - 106. 10.1109/MCOM.2009.4939284.]


Российский Квантовый Центр




### How to prepare states: Phase encoding

- $\mathbf{qubit}: \left| \psi \right\rangle = c_0 \left| 0 \right\rangle + c_1 e^{i\phi} \left| 1 \right\rangle$
- any qubit state can be created and measured in any basis






[C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)]



### **Practical realization**




As the two coherent contributions are separated by a few nanoseconds but propagating along the same fiber, the are essentially no temperature or stress induced fluctuation.





### Plug & Play

Phase; Fiber; 67KM [D. Stucki et al., New J. Phys. 4, 41(2002)]








### First commercial product by ID Quantique used this scheme







### First in Russia fiber based quantum cryptography setup developed in ISP




25 km quantum channel of single mode fiber for 1550nm 10% quantum efficiency at 5\*10-5 dark count probability per 3 ns gate. Operates at 0,1-0,2 photon/pulse (BB84 protocol) 30 bit/s sifted key rate demonstrated





### Floating basis protocol

New quantum key distribution protocol which refuses from fixed basis. Absence of the fixed basis allows to make setup tolerant to detector blinding attack and increase key generation rate







### Coherent one way protocol is inspired by classical communication


Coherent one way (COW) protocol (currently used by ID Quantique and University of Geneva)

Logical "0"

Logical "1"

Decoy state 1 is used to monitor the attempt to unauthorized measurement


Unconditional proofs in process



A fast and versatile QKD system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing

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








### **Distributed-phase-reference QKD**



Interference between neighbor pulses will be broken in the case of the photon number splitting attack


K. Inoue, E. Waks, Y. Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 037902 (2002)





### **How to realize: Polarization Coding**

Typical system



**Public Channel** 






### Polarization encoding can be low cost but it is questionable in vibrating fiber


Group in Bristol proposes to use polarization encoding but it is questionable in vibrating fiber

Low Cost and Compact Quantum Key Distribution

J L Duligall<sup>1</sup>, M S Godfrey<sup>1</sup>, K A Harrison<sup>2</sup>, W J Munro<sup>2</sup> and J G Rarity<sup>1</sup>

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#### Pulse difference is the issue:

- Wavelength
- Width
- Shape
- Time delay

llers operate at kHz

Fiber polarization controllers operate at kHz frequency







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 $<sup>^2</sup>$  Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford, Bristol, BS34  $8\mathrm{QZ}$ 

### Is the polarization bad case for fiber channels?

Polarization is drifting in the fiber Stability in the lab: minutes Stability in the common fiber building-building: seconds.


Number of optical schemes are polarization sensitive MDI QKD:


Yan-Lin Tang, et al., "Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution over 200 km", PRL 113, 190501 (2014)

A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez, and W. Tittel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).

Phase modulators are polarization sensitive. If Bob contains phase modulator most probably you need to control polarization

Marand, C., and P.D. Townsend, 1995, "Quantum key distribution over distances as long as 30 km", Optics Letters 20, 1695-1697.









### How to prepare four BB84 polarization states?

One can use 4 lasers
Fast and convenient
Inseparability problem


Lasers can be different in frequency, time or direction

It is possible to construct full polarization controller from LiNbO3 crystals
Piezo driven polarization controllers are not fast enough for random state preparation

Pockels cell allows us to prepare four maximum nonorthogonal states

It was used in the first QKD experiment (Bennett, Ch.H., F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin, 1992a, "Experimental Quantum Cryptography", J. Cryptology 5, 3-28.

Modern LiNbO3 modulators work with much lower voltage and higher bandwidth






### How do we prepare states?

We decide to use modern 10GHz fiber phase modulator as Pockels cell

Even small time imbalance will break interference in the case of chirped pulse

We propose to use identical phase modulator on the Bob side rotated to  $\pi/2$  to compensate the polarization mode dispersion.



Bob use this modulator for active basis choice

Two detectors are used instead of four

This scheme will allow to make QKD transmitter that of a USB stick size.





### States prepared by Pockels cell

Polarization distortion induced by long quantum channel are compensated by polarization controller

At the entrance of Alice's polarization controller amplitudes of two polarization components should be equal (polarization is not obligatory linear)

BB84 states are not obligatory diagonal +45, diagonal -45, left and right. It can be any pair of maximally non orthogonal states combined by equal horizontal


Δφ	SOP	$\Delta \phi$	SOP
0		0	8
$\pi/2$		$\pi/2$	0
π		π	0
$3\pi/2$		$3\pi/2$	







### **Polarization tuning**



Polarization can be tuned with piezoelectric-polarization-controller


Alice and Bob can announce part of the key to monitor QBER (usually it is "decoy" state events) If QBER exceeds threshold (for example 6%), Alice Increases Amplitude and sends predefined sequence to tune polarization controller

Bob tunes polarization to decrease QBER below required level (for example 3.5%) Bob varies 3 parameters to tune polarization. It takes about 20-40 seconds.





### **Clock tuning**



To synchronize clock we use additional laser and syncrodetector

To reduce the effect on single photon detectors we use wavelength and time division

To remain good detector synchronization we need to keep Alice and Bob clock difference below 100-150 ps.

We send trains of syncropulses about 800 times a second







### Photonic chips will dramatically change the QKD setup size

Using photonic chip all QKD optics can be made on centimeter size chip The only problem is the current cost of such chip is 2-10 kEUR


From: Practical challenges in quantum key distribution




### **Limits on physical security**



### Time reverse helps to solve problem of detector blinding



Entangled state
is distributed to make key
from non-classical correlations



Measurement is replaced by state preparation


Preparation by measurement





### Quantum key distribution provides a range of solutions for absolute information protection in various implementations







### **Optical fiber:**

- There are commercial products in the world now
- Used in standard lines
- Practical distance is up to 100 km (in laboratories is up to 400 km.)
- Typical speed of key generation is 1-1000 kbit/s.

### **Satellite implementation:**

- The movement of the satellite ensures the exchange of a secret key between any points on earth
- In 2016, China successfully launched the first satellite for the quantum cryptography technology

### **Open space:**

- Potentially miniaturized solution for individual use
- Possibility of install on mobile platforms for hard-to-reach areas and highlands






### New market – new possibilities

Today QKD market is the startup market



market



market



market



prototype



prototype

**TOSHIBA** 

Nor available for purchase

Best parameters

PTDFP

market


MSU/InfoTechs

market

ITMO/Kvanttelecom

market






QKD market, \$ M<sup>1</sup>

Confidential QRate 24


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Markets&Markets: Quantum cryptography market - 2017 to 2022

### Fast prototyping with modular system is an opportunity for our group




Modular system allows to change optical scheme, protocols and number of driving elements without knowledge in electronics





### Plug&play QKD alignment is the basic task









### RQC's solution for introducing quantum physics

RQC's solution is to use quantum cryptography as a tool for introducing quantum physics.

It is an effective tool because it has the desired property set to intrigue students and demonstrate many basic quantum principles.



### Integration with standard encryptor used in Sberbank and Rostelecom



### World leaders are China and Europe











- First product announced in 2001
- Demonstrated successful exit in 2018 with SK telecom


- Largest in the World production to supply network in China
- Number of products

## Secure now. Secure in the future.



Working with potential customers is conducted at the stage of the prototyping







QKD field test in 2016

Office No1

30 km

Office Nº2






GAZPROMBANK

### QKD networks are key to new quality provided by quantum technologies






### **Quantum network experiment (May 2017)**

- Quantum keys transport between three users over an intermediate trusted node
- First link generates quantum keys using the polarization-encoding scheme
- Second link employs the phase-encoding scheme.

E.O. Kiktenko, et al. Demonstration of a quantum key distribution network in urban fibre-optic communication lines // Quantum Electronics 47 (9), 798-802 (2017).







### Quantum key protects blockchain



#### Digital signatures – Quantum-unsafe



Hash functions – Believed to be quantum-safe...?



#### Quantum-secure blockchain opens new opportunities for QKD

- QKD guarantees information-theoretically secure authentication between users.
- The unconfirmed transactions are aggregated into a block.
- We propose to create blocks in a decentralized fashion. To this end, we employ the "broadcast" protocol.
- This protocol allows achieving a Byzantine agreement in any network with pairwise authenticated communication.
- We believe this scheme to be robust against not only the presently known capabilities of the quantum computer, but also those that may potentially be discovered in the future to make post-quantum cryptography schemes vulnerable.





### 2017-2018 Sberbank field tests








### **VPN**



25 km, 14 dB loss.






- Two Sberbank offices
- 25 km line, 8 segments, 14 dB loss
- 300 MHz pulse repetition rate
- BB84+ decoy
  - Signal 0,175 ph/pulse
  - Decoy 0,067 ph/pulse
- QBER 5,5 %
- 2 kbit/s raw key
- 0,1-0,9 kbit/s secret key
- Key consumption 256 bit per 400s.

### Quantum cryptography is a key for storage protection


- One of the solutions to protect data in the data center in s to spread it to different centers.
- To prevent compromise of the centers one propose to use proactive secret sharing [HJKY 95]
- QKD allows to protect data in the process of the data sharing.








### Quantum cryptography provides channel protection








## QKD already has number of business applications



### National Quantum Communication Backbone in China

- ➤ Inter-city quantum communication backbone with 32 trusted relays (~2000km)
- ➤ Inter-connection of four intra-city metropolitan networks
- For financial applications, public affairs, etc.
- > Test-bed for quantum foundations (e.g. frequency dissemination)








# One of 32 trusted nodes

#### Участники сети





# Tokyo network built by different groups





Communication layer

Key management layer

Quantum Layer

# European network SECOQC was built in 2008





# IDQuantique trusted node

Классические шифраторы:

L2, 2 Gbit/s L2, 10 Gbit/s L3 VPN, 100 Mbit/s

WDMs


Управление ключом

Квантовое распределение ключа на линии 4 km

Квантовое распределение ключа на линии 14 km


www.swissquantum.com

ID Quantique *Cerberis* system (2010)







### Russian quantum networks in 2024 will reach 10 000 km



### Switch based network reduces number of equipment











### Multiplexing of quantum and classical signals: Toshiba research example










#### **How to miniaturize QKD**

#### **Existing QKD**



#### Rack19" solution





One to one connection





High price of one channel




#### **Competitors:**

- ID Quantique
- Qubitekk
- QuantumCTek

#### New version with small alice and switch




#### Video card Alice





One to many connection (up to 1:128)





**Channel cost drops more than 10times** 





No competitors up to year 2019

# We're on the road to quantum internet

Now
Quantum Security

5 Years
Quantum-secure IoT
Quantum Internet









# QKD distance limit is driven by exponential loss


## Estimated key generation rate



# China is the only country with quantum satellite but may other are in the competition




- Unmanned or manned aircraft can distribute secret key bits through freespace optical quantum channel
- Information, encrypted by secret key, then can be transmitted through classical RF-channel or free-space optics communication






# Free space QKD initiative: prototyping for drones application



Information coding method, optical power level	Sifted key generation rate, kbit/s	Sifted quantum key error level, %
Phase coding, μ = 0.20	0.26	6.0
Polarization coding, μ = 0.20	170	1.4
Polarization coding, μ = 0.020	77	1.5
Polarization coding, μ = 0.0020	14	4.7






# **Satellite tracking**







#### **Active mirror stabilization**








QSpace project






# Quantum repeaters


- Problem: to get 1 photon after 1000 km line you need to make 1020 ts what is not practical
- Practical distances are within 100 km in the external lines and within 400 km in the lab (less than 1 bit/s)
- Solution comes from classical communication, we need a repeater
- What is a repeater
  - Device that captures a signal, regenerates it, and sends it further
- Classical repeater will inevitably cause noise
- Quantum repeater
  - Must capture and regenerate a photon without measuring its polarization
  - Requires *memory* for efficient operation
  - Requires entangled states

We need to create quantum correlations between Alice






# Entanglement swapping



- Long-distance entanglement can be created by *entanglement swapping* 
  - A Bell measurements on modes 2 and 4 entangles modes 1 and 4
  - This protocol has much in common with teleportation

# Quantum relay




entangled

### Long-distance entanglement can be created by entanglement swapping

but to succeed, all links must work simultaneously.

→ success probability still decreases exponentially with distance.


# The role of memory



#### But if we had quantum memory,

- entanglement in a link could be stored...
  until entanglement in other links has been created, too.
- Bell-measurement on adjacent quantum memories... will create the desired long-distance entanglement.
- Alice can teleport her photon to Bob

# Quantum repeater



- This technology is called *quantum repeater* 
  - Initial idea: H. Briegel *et al.*, 1998
  - In application to EIT and quantum memory: L.M. Duan et al., 2001
- Quantum memory for light is essential for long-distance quantum communications.



We're looking for talents!

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#### QUANTUM COMMUNICATIONS







