

Lecture 4 in Quantum communications (continuing education) course, 2 Dec 2021

QKD protocol and hacking

Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol



Alice's bit sequence	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
Bob's detection basis	+	×	+	+	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	×	+	+
Bob's measurement	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Retained bit sequence	1	–	–	1	0	0	–	1	0	0	–	1	–	0

Image reprinted from article: W. Tittel, G. Ribordy & N. Gisin, "Quantum cryptography," Physics World, March 1998

Intercept-resend attack





C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, in *Proc. Intl. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore, India)*, p. 175 (1984)

Phase (time-bin) encoding, interferometric QKD channel



$\varphi_A = 0$ or $\pi/2$: 0

π or $3\pi/2$: 1

Detection basis:

$\varphi_B = 0$: X

$\pi/2$: Z

Spontaneous parametric down-conversion

Type II

Energy conservation: $\omega_p = \omega_s + \omega_i$

Momentum conservation: $\vec{k}_p = \vec{k}_s + \vec{k}_i$

$$|\psi\rangle = (|H_1, V_2\rangle + |V_1, H_2\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$
$$= (|D_1, A_2\rangle + |A_1, D_2\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$



P. G. Kwiat *et al.*, Phys. Rev. Lett. **75**, 4337 (1995)

Image reprinted from: Wikipedia

Entangled-pair QKD



$$|\psi\rangle = (|H_1, V_2\rangle + |V_1, H_2\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$
$$= (|D_1, A_2\rangle + |A_1, D_2\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$$

A. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. **67**, 661 (1991)
C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. **68**, 557 (1992)

Entangled-pair QKD over 1120 km



J. Yin *et al.*, Nature **582**, 501 (2020)

Simulation | Challenges

QuVis

Quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol) using polarized photons



H/V +45/–45 Random bases Fixed bases H/V +45/–45

Introduction



Display controls

- ☑ Show key generation
- ☑ Show key bits
- ☑ Show total errors

Clear measurements

Alice Basis	Alice Value	Eve Basis	Eve Outcome	Bob Basis	Bob Outcome	Alice and Bob Same bases?	Key
H/V	1			H/V	1	YES	1
H/V	0			+45/–45	0	NO	
+45/–45	0			+45/–45	0	YES	0

Main controls

Send polarized photons to Bob

Single photon | Continuous

Fast forward 100 photons

Let Eve intercept and resend photons

Eavesdrop!

Most recent key bits (same bases)

Alice	Bob
1 0	1 0

Let Alice & Bob compare 20 bits

More measurements needed for error checking

Errors (all measurements)

		Theoretical
Total:	$N_{tot} = 3$	
Key bits:	$N_{key} = 2$	$0.5\ N_{tot}$
Errors:	$N_{err} = 0$	0
Probability	$\frac{N_{err}}{N_{key}} = 0.000$	0

https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/physics/quvis/simulations_html5/sims/BB84_photons/BB84_photons.html

THORLABS

Discovery

EDU-QCRY1
EDU-QCRY1/M
Quantum Cryptography Demonstration Kit

Manual

Photo ©2020 Vadim Makarov / RQC

MSc labs: vad1.com/c/lqpc

Certification of cryptographic tools

Government

National security agency

Legal requirements

Approval

Accredited lab

System

Certificate

Engineering documentation

IDQ

Manufacturer

Sale

Customer


THEORY
EXPERIMENT
M STEVENS

Implementation security of quantum communications



Hack

Integrate imperfection into security model

Formal certification: we need standards and labs ecosystem

Threat model



physically secure,
characteristics known

physically secure,
characteristics known

Kerckhoffs' principle:

Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi

A. Kerckhoffs, J. des Sciences Militaires **9**, 5 (1883)

Everything about the system that is not explicitly secret is known to the enemy

Attack	Target component	Tested system
Distinguishability of decoy states A. Huang *et al.,* Phys. Rev. A **98**, 012330 (2018)	laser in Alice	3 research systems
Intersymbol interference K. Yoshino *et al.,* poster at QCrypt (2016)	intensity modulator in Alice	research system
Laser damage V. Makarov *et al.,* Phys. Rev. A **94**, 030302 (2016); A. Huang *et al.,* poster at QCrypt (2018)	any	5 commercial & 1 research systems
Spatial efficiency mismatch M. Rau *et al.,* IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. **21**, 6600905 (2015); S. Sajeed *et al.,* Phys. Rev. A **91**, 062301 (2015)	receiver optics	2 research systems
Pulse energy calibration S. Sajeed *et al.,* Phys. Rev. A **91**, 032326 (2015)	classical watchdog detector	ID Quantique
Trojan-horse I. Khan *et al.,* presentation at QCrypt (2014)	phase modulator in Alice	SeQureNet
Trojan-horse N. Jain *et al.,* New J. Phys. **16**, 123030 (2014); S. Sajeed *et al.,* Sci. Rep. **7**, 8403 (2017)	phase modulator in Bob	ID Quantique
Detector saturation H. Qin, R. Kumar, R. Alleaume, Proc. SPIE 88990N (2013)	homodyne detector	SeQureNet
Shot-noise calibration P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, E. Diamanti, Phys. Rev. A **87**, 062313 (2013)	classical sync detector	SeQureNet
Wavelength-selected PNS M.-S. Jiang, S.-H. Sun, C.-Y. Li, L.-M. Liang, Phys. Rev. A **86**, 032310 (2012)	intensity modulator	(theory)
Multi-wavelength H.-W. Li *et al.,* Phys. Rev. A **84**, 062308 (2011)	beamsplitter	research system
Deadtime H. Weier *et al.,* New J. Phys. **13**, 073024 (2011)	single-photon detector	research system
Channel calibration N. Jain *et al.,* Phys. Rev. Lett. **107**, 110501 (2011)	single-photon detector	ID Quantique
Faraday-mirror S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, L.-M. Liang, Phys. Rev. A **83**, 062331 (2011)	Faraday mirror	(theory)
Detector control I. Gerhardt *et al.,* Nat. Commun. **2**, 349 (2011); L. Lydersen *et al.,* Nat. Photonics **4**, 686 (2010)	single-photon detector	ID Quantique, MagiQ, research systems



Anqi Huang tests countermeasure in Clavis2

Polarization receiver for satellite



C. J. Pugh *et al.*, Quantum Sci. Technol. **2**, 024009 (2017)

Polarization analyzer



J.-P. Bourgoin *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **92**, 052339 (2015)

Polarization analyzer



J.-P. Bourgoin *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **92**, 052339 (2015)

Efficiency mismatch in polarization analyzer



S. Sajeed *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **91**, 062301 (2015)

Detector efficiency without pinhole



Attack angles

...and with 25 μm diameter pinhole



No attack found

S. Sajeed *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **91**, 062301 (2015)

Counter-attack



V. Makarov *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **94**, 030302 (2016)


Thorlabs P20S pinhole
13 µm thick stainless steel
3.6 W, 810 nm laser
* Sound was added later
0
1 mm


Thorlabs P20S pinhole
13 µm thick stainless steel
3.6 W, 810 nm laser
* Sound was added later
0
1 mm

Security audit	System	Report	Tests
IDQ	 Clavis3	2016	–2018 interrupted
国盾量子 QuantumCTek	 40 MHz	2016, 2018–19	ongoing
ITMO UNIVERSITY (ООО Квантовые коммуникации)	Subcarrier scheme	2018	ongoing
QRATE	New 312.5 MHz system	(2021)	ongoing

S. Sajeed *et al.*, Sci. Rep. **11**, 5110 (2021)

Certification standards are being drafted since 2019 in

ETSI — Industry standards group in QKD

ISO

Example of initial analysis report

TABLE I: **Summary of potential security issues in [redacted] system.**

Potential security issue	C	Q	Target component	Brief description	Requirements for complete analysis	Lab testing needed?	Risk evaluation
[redacted]	CX	Q1–5,7	[redacted]	[redacted]	Complete circuit diagram of	Yes	High
[redacted]	CX	Q1–3	[redacted]	See Ref. 3.	Complete circuit diagram of	Yes	High
[redacted]	CX	Q1,2	[redacted]	See Ref. 4.	Complete circuit diagram of	Yes	High
[redacted]	C0	Q2,3	[redacted]	Manufacturer needs to implement [redacted]	Known issue. The manufacturer should patch it.	No	High
[redacted]	CX	Q3–5,7	[redacted]	[redacted]	Known issue. The manufacturer should [redacted]	No	Medium
[redacted]	CX	Q1	[redacted]	[redacted]	Model numbers of all optical components; complete receiver for testing.	Yes	High
[redacted]	CX	Q1–5	[redacted]	[redacted]	Complete circuit diagram of [redacted] settings of	Yes	Insufficient information
[redacted]	CX	Q1–3	[redacted]	[redacted]	Algorithm of [redacted]	Yes	Low
[redacted]	CX	Q1,2	[redacted]	See Ref. 13.	Model numbers of [redacted]	Yes	Medium
[redacted]	CX	Q4,5	[redacted]	[redacted]	Full system algorithms; complete system if decided to test.	Maybe	Low
[redacted]	CX	Q1,3–5	[redacted]	Eve can [redacted]	Algorithm for [redacted]	Maybe	Low

RQC MISIS Quantum hacking lab vad1.com/lab